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We recently spent a year with a class of 13- to 14-year-olds in a fairly typical London school. 
We followed 28 young people through their lessons at school, and in the corridors and 
playground moments of the school day, and then we spent time with them in their homes, 
meeting their parents, understanding their friendship groups, sharing their hobbies, discussing 
their social networks, going online together. Our interest lay in how this highly diverse group 
made sense of the world—what was expected of them, what gave them pleasure, and what 
problems they encountered. Our purpose was to grasp young people’s own views of the 
world and how these intersected with the views of their parents, teachers, and the wider 
society. Avoiding a media-centric approach, a central thread through our ethnographic 
portrait was the young people’s everyday use of media and, more profoundly, their 
experience of growing up in a so-called “digital age.” 
In The Class: Living and Learning in the Digital Age, we interrogate these views and 
experiences through the lens of late modern theories of selfhood, pedagogy, and sociality 
(Livingstone and Sefton-Green 2016). More than ever before, people are charged with 
charting their own course through life and taking responsibility for their own risks to a degree 
that contrasts markedly with previous eras, when social convention and tradition had greater 
force. Yet in trying to cope with the stresses of modernity, people are beset by unprecedented 
levels of uncertainty—incomplete knowledge, conflicting experts, complex decisions, 
precarious alliances, untrustworthy institutions, too little time. 
Socio-technological developments promise enticing solutions and enhanced life choices, but 
they demand complex calculations of risk that preoccupy and burden us. As Zygmunt 
Bauman (2002, xv–xvi) put it: “Modernity replaces determinism of social standing with 
compulsive and obligatory self-determination… Let there be no mistake: now, as before, 
individualization is a fate, not a choice.” From this perspective, each individual is on their 
own, since traditional networks of support or welfare provision are no longer reliable or ever-
present. Thus Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2002, 23) write of the necessity 
for individuals to become “actors, builders, jugglers, stage managers of their own biographies 
and identities and also of their social links and networks.” Moreover, the unequally 
distributed resources of social, economic and cultural capital that individuals have at their 
disposal are further exacerbated through the processes of social reproduction. As a result, 
“social inequality is on the rise precisely because of the spread of individualization” (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim 2002, xxiv). But Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue further that we must 
now recognize “the non-class character of individualized inequalities”—for while inequality 
is still with us, the dis-embedding “processes of individualization deprive class distinctions of 
their social identity” (2002, 39). 
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Somewhat problematically for our project, such theories of late modernity appear to speak for 
everyone yet they devote relatively little attention to the nature or specificities of children’s 
experiences or of the key institutions of family and school that shape them. In this chapter, 
we contribute to this volume’s analysis of the changing relations between media and social 
class in late modernity by reflecting on what we learned from our fieldwork about the lived 
realities of social class in the class (forgive the double use of “class”!), focusing on the young 
people’s use of media and the wider processes of mediation in which their lives are 
entangled. 
Conceiving of class difference 
The contention that it is class consciousness rather than inequality that is fading in late 
modernity certainly rang true in our fieldwork. People still use the terms “middle” and 
“working” class, but the meaning of these terms is changing, no longer mapping neatly onto 
right and left wings of the political spectrum, or management and workforce, or even onto 
wealthy and poor but instead referring to a looser association between social status and forms 
of knowledge, social capital, and cultural tastes and habits. Social class, as several 
contributors to this volume have noted, involves an active process of identification and 
signaling ways of belonging to wider collectivities, not a deterministic process of positioning 
through socio-economic factors. 
In our study differences of social class (and indeed, racial difference) were publically effaced 
by the school, creating a seemingly “fair’ neutrality despite the fact that students spoke 
multiple languages, practiced the breadth of the world’s religions and, while some lived in 
homes worth several million pounds, others lived in state-subsidized council (“social”) 
housing. Some of the students were migrants or refugees with educated parents who had held 
high-status jobs in their country of origin but now lived in far poorer circumstances. In about 
half the families, the mothers had higher education degrees, but in other cases, especially 
single-parent families, parents were working in low-paid precarious jobs. From economic, 
cultural, and social perspectives (Savage 2015), the young people in our class were a 
microcosm of contemporary Britain, and they lived with the risk of conflict, 
misunderstanding, and prejudice also faced by the wider society. 
While teachers, parents, and the young people themselves generally endorsed the idea that all 
should be equal, treated according to their individual merits, the class was hardly unaware of 
differences in social class. We saw this most clearly in the choice of friendships, enacted 
offline and online, where the young people self-assorted into relatively homogeneous 
groupings by socio-economic position, ethnicity, and gender, albeit with interesting 
exceptions that we explore in the book. But while most of the young people preferred not to 
articulate this as anything other than a personal choice, Megan and Shane had a go at 
discussing differences of social class, drawing on a polarized discourse of “people like me” 
and “others.” Megan, a popular girl from a middle-class family, gave a highly coded account, 
based on who lived where and which elementary school they went to. When asked to explain 
further, she admitted that: 
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“I’m not really friends with—this sounds bad—any poor people. But that’s not because 
I’m not friends with people who are poor. It’s just that just happens to be who I’m 
friends with.” 
We thought this comment suggested a commitment to holding on to these social distinctions, 
but Megan did not welcome our pushing her on this point. Indeed, when we next asked 
whether the mix of backgrounds at the school was problematic, Megan was glad to explicate 
the democratic vision of the whole class: 
“No, I don’t really think that’s an issue, like, because we all go to the same school, so 
we’re not that different... It’s not like we’re going to have fights: ‘You’re not as rich as 
me. I don’t like you.’ So I don’t think it matters. I think it’s good because you can 
always meet someone who’s, like, different to you.” 
Shane, whose family was not well off, was more willing to explain how social class divided 
the students: 
“In our year, we’ve got the posh people. There’s the people that play pat ball, football, 
and the people that chat about rubbish.” 
Whilst Shane had no trouble identifying “the posh people,” he found it hard to explain why 
they merited such a label: “They’re not posh, but we just call them posh, I don’t know why.” 
Although it may not have been obvious from his initial classification, Shane was not keen on 
those who “play pat ball,” preferring those who play football (soccer) or “chat about 
rubbish”—meaning, “not chat about rubbish but, like, the people, like, always having a 
laugh.” 
The wealthier parents had chosen to live in a mixed neighborhood and to send their children 
to the local school rather than to bring them up in a more privileged context. Some of the less 
well-off parents had worked hard to give their child this chance to benefit from a “good 
school.” Shane lived on the edge of the catchment area, and his mother told us of her efforts 
to get him into the school as a way of extricating himself from the more problematic 
environment of his primary school, and was glad that his new friends were, as she told us, 
“lovely boys, all well-mannered kids.” This did not necessarily provide Shane with a 
straightforward route to “success.” As he explained, “when I was younger, I wanted to be a 
footballer. But it’s not as easy as people think it is.” Later, he reflected: “I’m basically 
guaranteed a job with my uncle, but if not, I’d rather be a carpenter or like something 
designing stuff, making wood.” 
Although Shane was from a poor background and Megan from a relatively privileged one, 
both were more able to identify privilege than poverty. In our sociologically informed efforts 
to classify members of the class, we faced a similar hurdle: identifying who was middle class 
was fairly straightforward but, with the exception of Shane himself (who bore a remarkable 
resemblance to Paul Willis’ lads “learning to labour”; see Willis 1978), none of the class 
could be neatly labeled as working class, with several having more cultural capital than one 
might expect from their economic resources, for reasons of migration or divorce. 
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Mediated imaginaries 
Schools are expected to fulfill more roles than simply providing and accrediting learning. 
They are organized in ways that promote a particular way of being. Given that members of a 
class are brought together not exactly by accident but by processes over which they have little 
control, they have to learn to manage their relations with each other and with the wider 
community of the school. Recognizing the wide diversity of backgrounds accommodated 
within the class, the school in our study had good reason to emphasize a narrative about the 
students as a collectivity. As their class teacher Catherine explained, “they have a real sense 
of, you know, an identity as [the class] and I think that, for the most part, they’re quite proud 
of that.” Another teacher added, when asked about the relations among the wealthier and 
poorer students, “I don’t think it affects, necessarily, the way they interact with each other.” 
Or, as Megan explained, in justifying the school’s seemingly arbitrary rules on uniform and 
appearance, “It’s like being a community, because everyone is the same.” While some may 
read the efforts of the school critically as imposing middle-class social norms on the 
potentially unruly mass, civility can also connote positive ideas of tolerating or getting on 
with others (Elias 2000). As Susanne Wessendorf (2014, 392) observes of highly urban 
multicultural neighborhoods, such as that of our school, these are “super-diverse” and thus 
demand “civility towards diversity” as a daily strategy of their inhabitants—for survival, and 
for effective functioning. 
Stanton Wortham (2005, 1) argues that not only do the “social identification, power relations 
and interpersonal struggles” of daily life occur in the classroom as anywhere else, but they 
also intersect with the academic learning that necessarily occurs there. Wortham was 
particularly interested in the “common pedagogical strategy of building an analogy between 
students’ actual or hypothetical experiences and the curricular topic” (2005, 2). Since 
building these analogies is doubly hazardous—both because the teachers know little of the 
students’ lives at home and because these are themselves very diverse—popular culture is 
often positioned as a shared body of experience by which teachers can bridge what students 
are presumed to know already and what they need to learn. To motivate students in physical 
education, the teacher observed that they would do the same warm-up exercises as celebrity 
footballers. To advertise the science club in the year group assembly, students were enjoined 
to find out “how an iPhone works.” To explain graphs in math, the exercises were to plot data 
on mobile phone tariffs or Hollywood film profits. To judge work in geography, students 
were invited to act as judges in X Factor, a popular reality television show. These popular 
culture references far from matched the actual interests of the students, and at times they 
actively masked significant differences between them, skating over potential conflicts. So, 
while to the teachers, references to television programs or listening to music offered a kind of 
common culture (see Jones 2009, on how popular culture has come to stand in for common 
culture) that enabled both teaching and civility, the limitations of this approach were never 
far away. 
Meanwhile, in their leisure time the young people exploited the potential of media to imagine 
more individualized alternatives to the shared imaginary constructed by the school. For 
example, Abby, from a poor, mixed-race home, loved music because: 
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“I think music, kind of, describes a person really. So like, if there was like… if you 
listen to that type of music they’re kind of, they’ve got their own type of personality 
kind of, like that music and I think if you, like, listen to, like R&B type music, you’re 
not exactly like [unclear] or nothing, but you kind of, have the same type of personality 
as the music.” 
And Megan, from a more privileged and artistic home, said: 
“All Tumblrs are different so you can have some which is just writing or some that is 
just pictures… I used to have a Kawaii blog, which is like… although if I Tumblr it’s 
just a random [thing]—if I thought something was nice I’d re-blog it. Then I went to 
Kawaii which is flashing images and now it’s gone to Hipstar, sort of indie.” 
To these girls, their choices are highly individual, however outsiders might interpret them. 
Building on her choices, Abby imagines how her interest in music could lead her first to an 
elite music school and then to a musical career, though when we talked again a few months 
later, she had already given up on that idea. Dilruba, who lived in a low-income, mixed-
ethnicity family of four girls and a single-parent mother, dreamed of a career in fashion, 
which she expressed partly through being an early adopter of Twitter—as a way of “keeping 
up-to-date. Just, like, looking, like, seeing celebrity lives.” 
At that time, Twitter permitted entry to an adult world, allowing first steps in following, 
contributing, and trying things out, even if little noticed by others. Abby, too, had also 
worked out that Twitter could bring her closer to the music world that she hoped to join as a 
career. And so had Dominic, from a far wealthier home: as a footballer and football fan, he 
would join in Twitter conversations among professional footballers and commentators, 
enjoying the chance to be part of something that he cared about but which was beyond his 
normal reach as a young teenager. 
By contrast, the whole class used Facebook. Whilst once exciting as a space of identity work 
(Livingstone 2008), this was used by the young people in a remarkably parallel manner to the 
school’s civil space, as an online domain in which banal but significant phatic and identity 
tasks could be played out. Almost everyone was “friends” on Facebook with everyone else, 
rendering this meaningless for the construction of strong ties or for more intimate 
explorations of selfhood but meaningful in terms of weak ties (Granovetter 1983; Hampton 
and Wellman 2003) and the generalized construction of a common social belonging. 
In short, consumption of media represents a key site for young people’s identity work, 
(Buckingham 2008), both providing a visible way of marking the acceptance or rejection of 
taste cultures (Thornton 1995), but also because, in ways young people may relish more than 
adults, media consumption affords easy and active experimentation with possible identities. 
Insofar as “taste classifies and it classifies the classifier” (Bourdieu 1984), our fieldwork 
revealed young people’s lives lived between the social conservativism of family and school 
life and the mediated imaginaries made possible through media connections. These mediated 
imaginaries served to reinforce a kind of conservative progressiveness—an enlightenment 
notion of civility—whilst also offering the flexibility for individualized escape routes. 
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Educational aspirations and the digital home 
At home, we saw a similar oscillation being played out between the shared experiences of 
family life—often with the family on the sofa around the television set for at least some part 
of each day, usually at the instigation of a determined parent, irrespective of social class—
and the desire of family members to pursue individual pursuits in their own time and spaces 
(for children, usually in their bedrooms and/or online). But in one crucial respect digital 
media were co-opted into a highly classed practice, namely, that of supporting school 
learning and, thereby, children’s imagined futures. In this regard, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given a context of considerable anxieties over precarious futures, we saw parents (as well as 
school) tending to see children less in terms of who they are or what they do than in terms of 
who they could become (Qvortrup et al. 1994; Corsaro 2011). Crucially, digital media are 
being co-opted into the future-oriented effort to ensure children “keep up” or “get ahead” 
(Blum-Ross and Livingstone 2016), with an emphasis on the provision of curricular 
knowledge in ways that promise competitive academic achievement and, perhaps, social 
mobility. 
Yet the evidence shows that social mobility—the chance for young people to improve on the 
material conditions of their parents—has ground to a halt in recent decades, to the point 
where developed countries can no longer promise future generations increased prosperity or 
quality of life (Brown et al. 2011; Cribb et al. 2013; Putnam 2015). Rather, as Basil Bernstein 
(1990) argued, education “re-contextualizes” knowledge so as to ensure success for young 
people from middle-class homes compared with those who are less privileged. In effect, 
education is a key instrument for the social reproduction of inequality, notwithstanding that it 
professes “fairness.” This intensifies the felt burden on parents as they struggle to ensure that 
their child can be included among school’s beneficiaries. 
Social reproduction occurs as much, if not even more, at home than at school as families with 
already-greater economic and cultural capital work competitively to sustain their social 
advantages (Bourdieu 1984). These processes, too, appear intensified in late modernity. In 
the UK, Valerie Hey (2000) wrote of the “offensive” sociality (or “pushy individualism”) of 
the new middle class by contrast with the “defensive” sociality of the disadvantaged (with 
their reliance of the traditions of hierarchy). In the US, Annette Lareau (2011) contrasted the 
rigorous schedule of adult-organized out-of-school enrichment activities (“concerted 
cultivation”) practiced by middle-class families with working-class families’ assumption of 
“natural growth,” arguing that the former breeds a cumulative sense of entitlement in children 
which helps them get ahead in institutionalized settings such as the school. Meanwhile, in 
working-class families, “the cultural logic of child rearing at home is out of synch with the 
standards of institutions” (2011, 3), and thus “social class dynamics are woven into the 
texture and rhythm of children and parents’ daily lives” (2011, 236) to the disadvantage of 
the already disadvantaged. 
In our study we focused on the relationship—imagined and practiced—between learning at 
school and at home. In a host of different ways, digital media promised to undergird this 
relationship in progressive ways, improving mutual understanding, overcoming dysfunctional 
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boundaries, building on spontaneous interests, and supporting personalized pathways. Yet the 
realities more often supported processes of social reproduction. In our book, we traced this in 
two main ways. One was how families acquired and deployed home computing technology 
so as to support their children’s homework, arranging a corner of the home and devoting time 
in the daily routine to ensuring its “proper” use. A second was the way in which some of the 
families supported their children’s music learning, variously providing instruments, lessons, 
and social and other forms of support. We have only space here to illustrate the first of these, 
with two vignettes. 
Yusuf’s parents, Muslim immigrants from East Africa, took the idea of supporting learning in 
the home a step further. They had invested in an expensive but unaccredited set of CDs 
containing a curriculum in math and English for their four children to improve their 
educational outcomes working individually in an especially kitted-out bedroom at home. The 
father, originally a trained nurse but now working as a railway ticket inspector, acted as the 
head teacher (school principal), charting the children’s progress on a series of complex wall 
charts. Yusuf’s teachers were unaware of this domestic investment in technology and effort, 
and it was unclear whether it brought educational benefits—especially as Yusuf was 
withdrawn for language support at school. Indeed, we saw a rather reserved boy with little 
time to relax or identify and pursue his own interests. 
By contrast, Giselle’s educated and artistic parents supported a host of creative learning 
practices in their daughter, including a mother who took sketchbooks, paints, and an easel on 
holiday to teach her children art, and child-led rather than grade-led music lessons with an 
“alternative” teacher. A similar structure of support framed Giselle’s technological pursuits. 
For example, her father told us unprompted of how her Minecraft play developed 
technological fluency and social skills to participate in a virtual social world. Giselle had 
learned to conceive of her game-play as part of her interest-driven artistic practice, 
contrasting with the school’s hard distinction between art lessons, ICT lessons, and, excluded 
from school entirely, playing computer games. 
Unlike Yusuf’s home, which mimicked school routines, testing, and outcomes, for Giselle it 
was home that was seen as superior in providing creative and flexible opportunities to learn, 
and school that failed to match up. As Giselle’s father said: 
“I don’t know what happens in the school really… when it comes to music I think it 
always sounded like music is a bit chaotic generally at school, and isn’t really the place 
to really... the music classes aren’t really the place to do much at all....” 
Our book offers more such examples, further complicating any simple conclusions about 
digital media use in relation to social class. But we do want to stress that it wasn’t the 
working-class families just leaving their children to grow up as they might, while middle-
class families push theirs ahead. Rather, we saw most if not all parents strive for some degree 
of “concerted cultivation,” to borrow Lareau’s terminology, or for some “curricularization” 
of leisure time (Buckingham and Sefton-Green 2004), but their differential starting points in 
terms of cultural capital made for differential outcomes. Supporting and going beyond the 
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accounts of Hey, Lareau, and others, we observed, first, that some middle-class parents 
deliberately eschewed competitive pressures by seeking alternative approaches which, since 
they were often built around artistic endeavors, we decided to call “bohemian.” Second, since 
many of our poorer families belonged to minority ethnic cultures, the pedagogic support they 
provided at home tended either to misrecognize the values of the majority culture (and, 
thereby, the school’s values) or to result in outcomes that could not be converted into those 
valued or even recognized by the school. 
Mediated disconnections 
While parents often used digital media as part of their efforts to build a bridge between home 
and school, albeit sometimes unsuccessfully, a further theme emerging from our study of 
media use was the desire for positive disconnections. As we saw in a host of apparently 
disparate but thematically linked ways, children, parents, and teachers all had good reasons to 
try to keep the spaces of their lives distinct. And, in a highly mediated age, this often meant 
subtly undermining the extraordinary capacity for digital networks to connect previously 
unconnected people, activities, or experiences in an effort to preserve privacy and autonomy. 
In one such episode, we saw how digital connections could work against the interests of those 
with something to lose, even as they might, in other circumstances, aid those with something 
to gain from the greater visibility of their private lives. Aiden, an Afro-Caribbean boy in the 
class, had been expelled from a previous school for violent behavior, and his family was, we 
were told, “known to social services,” meaning that the family was in receipt of a range of 
state interventions. At school we observed him to be generally polite but reserved, seemingly 
anxious to avoid trouble, and to make a success of this new opportunity. However, he 
brought a somewhat dangerous air of what he termed “the street” into the social world of the 
class, and on several occasions we witnessed his good behavior disintegrate as he became 
drawn into disruptive exchanges. 
One day we arrived at school to learn that it was no longer prepared to try to integrate Aiden 
into mainstream education; he had, in effect, been expelled again. The trigger was an incident 
on Facebook, but as so often, behind the amplification of conflict on Facebook lay a “real-
life” (offline) incident, which he described to us in these terms: 
“Basically some girl Facebooked me and said, ‘How did you get out at lunchtime?’ And 
I said, ‘I’m allowed to go.’ And then she said, ‘Oh, I’m going to come with you.’ And 
I’m like, ‘Okay, cool, but if you get caught, don’t bring my name into it.’ And then she 
came with me, and we were in… some chicken and chip shop. And then we were 
playing about: she was grabbing me as a little play thing, and I punched her in her leg. 
And then she told her friend. And then her friend started hyping [acting ‘over the top’] 
to me on Facebook, and I replied back. And then I don’t know how the school found 
out or what it had to do with them... She told her friend, who was a boy, and then he 
started hyping to me. And then I retaliated, and I don’t know how the school got 
involved.” 
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Reflecting on this incident, both Aiden and his mother acknowledged that he was at fault, but 
Aiden was adamant that this incident was not a matter for school. In his view, such peer 
interactions—on Facebook, on the street—were played out according to social codes that 
adults did not understand, nor were they meant to. He put a lot of effort into managing life at 
school so as to keep it quite separate from life with his tight group of friends “on the street,” 
and so he felt the school’s decision was unjust. 
When we visited Aiden’s Facebook profile, we found that the seemingly reserved boy we had 
met at school had more “friends” than anyone else in the class (over 1,000) and low privacy 
settings, and he chatted daily with much vigor and interest. These communications revealed a 
curious mix—for the most part, he presented himself as a tough guy, strutting, flirting, 
threatening, and swearing. Yet there were also some photos of a “good boy,” along with 
happy birthday messages, suggesting (to us) a curious switching between seemingly 
incompatible identity performances. 
Most interesting was the way in which Aiden sought to manage the boundary between 
personal and public through his use of language. Quietly well-spoken at school to adults, 
online he relished the linguistic repertoire of black London English along with contemporary 
forms of hip-hop culture (in this case, variants of British “Grime,” London-centric rap). On 
Facebook, nearly all expressions were in this argot, often involving highly sexist and sexual 
observations about women, violence, and anger, as well as solidarity with other oppressed 
black youth. The very frequency and intensity of these interactions revealed Aiden’s 
investment in asserting particular identity practices, in contrast with the largely banal yet civil 
online interactions of most of the class. For Aiden, unlike others in the class, Facebook 
offered a closed and peer-directed space for important personal expression and subcultural 
solidarity. 
Had such interactions remained “on the street,” it is possible that Aiden could have 
maintained the boundaries between different parts of his life. Interestingly, his teachers 
tended to share Aiden’s view that in-school and out-of-school spaces should be separate. But 
as they explained to us, once Facebook had made the out-of-school visible within school, 
they could not fail to take action. Indeed, several teachers had complained to us that social 
networking incidents increasingly opened up an unwelcome and troublesome window onto 
the mess and muddle (as they saw it) of some of the students’ lives out of school, forcing 
them to deal with problems that they regarded as outside their remit. As one teacher said, “I 
honestly think that some students become something quite different when they are online.” 
Then, compounding the problem, “unfortunately often that home matter spills into school, 
and that’s where… that’s where that tension and that difficulty lies, because we then have to 
call home and say, ‘There’s been this incident. Part of the investigation has shown that it 
stemmed from…’ And then you’re into home territory.” 
Over and again, teachers told us of incidents in which events in one location had spilled over 
and continued online and then all through the day, to the point that they felt they had to 
intervene in life out of school in order to protect school standards. One problem was the way 
in which Facebook interactions leave “hard traces,” making them difficult to ignore: as one 
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teacher commented in the middle of a longer story of student conflict—“then one of the 
parents showed me the evidence, the rock-solid, watertight evidence, of the Facebook 
exchange which definitely proved [what had been claimed].” Yet these teachers knew that 
they could be presented with edited highlights, so that dis-entangling what had really 
happened in an out-of-school exchange might prove both technically challenging and highly 
time-consuming. In short, although Aiden’s story is a sadly familiar one of social 
disadvantage reproducing itself across generations, the digital media have complicated 
matters—on the one hand, creating a new space for at times rapid-fire transgressive peer 
interaction, while on the other, undermining long-established boundaries of authority 
dividing home and school in ways that can become troubling for all concerned. 
Conclusions 
Our analysis of the relation between media and social class in the lives of a class of 13- to 14-
year-olds began by questioning the continued relevance of the contrast between middle- and 
working-class families, given that the class included educated families with little money, 
minority ethnic families with strong subcultures but lacking majority-cultural capital, female-
headed households difficult to classify in traditional class terms, and few, if any, traditional 
working-class households at all. Our ethnography went on to show how social class could not 
predict family responses to the demands of late modernity. For instance, some of the middle-
class families were content to endorse the authority of the school whilst others sought more 
“bohemian” alternatives, and some of the migrant families prioritized values and practices 
characteristic of their home cultures (and local subcultures) rather than those endorsed by the 
school or wider society. These alternative or subcultural pathways were rather quietly trod, 
with rich subcultural knowledge gained outside the school sometimes making little impact on 
or even being recognized by the bounded life of the school. 
In contrast to earlier studies of school life (see Willis 1978; Giroux 1983), we weren’t struck 
by either “hidden curricula” or the processes of “learning to labour” that implicitly validate 
middle-class children while working-class children are allocated to the factory floor or seek 
tactics of resistance. This is not because the school was as fair as it claimed but rather, 
because the discourse of individual competition and success was made explicit rather than 
tacit. Differences in opportunity or achievement were not seen as either controversial or 
unfair—quite the contrary. Thus, it seems that a sense of collective classed identity is giving 
way to an uncertain and ambivalent recognition of status differentials, understood as a matter 
of individual talent or luck, good or bad. The long-term outcome—that social advantage and 
disadvantage persist, with little social mobility evident—is little changed from 20 years ago, 
but the means by which it comes about and the implications for identity and social relations 
are being reconfigured. 
What can schools or families do about the determining influences of social class? How could 
different conceptions of learning alter such seemingly over-determining social structures? 
These questions have haunted almost every study of childhood and youth and, with varying 
degrees of explicitness, they underpin most countries’ education and family policies, as well 
as those for digital inclusion and educational technology. While investigating young people’s 
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lives in the round might seem only to deepen our knowledge of these challenges, we also 
believe that it reveals some chinks in the processes of social reproduction, at least for some 
young people in some circumstances. As we argue in more depth in our book, paying 
attention to the ways that young people develop and enact their identities within particularly 
enabling or constraining contexts, often mediated, enabled us to reveal not so much cruel fate 
as society’s lack of imagination and resources for creating alternatives. By imagining and 
investing in alternatives that can expand young people’s vision of future opportunities, by 
establishing new pathways by which such opportunities might be reached, perhaps their 
prospects could be altered. But our year with the class has also taught us that such a project 
can only work if it engages with people’s identity commitments to how things have been until 
now, and with their often-justified fears about a risky or threating future. 
Notes 
1
 This chapter draws on research supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation under Prime Award no. 10-97572-000-USP and the Regents of the University of 
California. It draws on material published in Sonia Livingstone and Julian Sefton-Green, The 
Class: Living and Learning in the Digital Age (New York: New York University Press, 
2016). 
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